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LIABILITY OF CHILD SOLDIERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW
Fanny Leveau*

The phenomenon of child soldiers has gained increased attention since the
condemnation, last year, of Thomas Lubanga for recruiting and using child
soldiers. However, not much has been said about the crimes perpetrated by
those children. This article looks at child soldiers as perpetrators of crimes
and examines their potential criminal accountability under international
criminal law. Interpretation of international instruments suggests that child
soldiers could be prosecuted by international criminal tribunals. However,
those prosecutions would have to respect specific standards.

Child soldiers can be viewed as victims, recruited to commit
military acts against their will. The act of recruiting child soldiers is a
war crime1; however, as soldiers, they may be perpetrators of the
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1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998,
2187 UNTS 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002) [Rome Statute], arts 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and
8(2)(e)(vii); Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra
Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, signed 16 January
2002, 2178 UNTS 138 (entered into force 12 April 2002) [Statute of the SCSL], art
4(c).
*

36

crimes of torture, maiming, rape, and the killing of civilians.2
Therefore, the question arises as to whether they should be held liable
for these crimes. Indeed, one may wonder why children would be
shielded from prosecution when they commit such crimes. The aim of
this article is to explore the arguments given in favour of and opposed
to the criminal liability of children in order to establish conclusions
regarding the liability of child soldiers under international criminal
law. One may feel that children should be held accountable for their
crimes because it would serve justice for the victims; however, it
appears to be difficult to defend accountability for children who may
be too young to be considered capable of committing crimes, or, in
many situations, who acted under duress when committing crimes.
The legal discussion on the issue of criminal liability of child soldiers
is primarily based on the concept of mens rea. In other words,
international criminal law must determine whether child soldiers can
actually intend to commit international crimes. I will examine the
difficulties raised by the prosecution of children at the international
level. I will proceed to present arguments in favour of child criminal
liability, thereby arguing that child soldiers should be prosecuted. I
will place emphasis upon the obstacles to the prosecution of child
soldiers. I conclude by arguing that if child soldiers are to be
prosecuted, the minimum age for criminal liability should be fixed at
fifteen years old and all the guarantees of a juvenile justice system
should be offered.
I
ISSUES WHEN DEALING WITH CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CHILDREN AT THE
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
So far, child soldiers have never been prosecuted by
international criminal tribunals. Nevertheless, it is important to think
about the theoretical possibility of the prosecution of children because
of the increasing attention being given to the issue of child soldiering.
Even so, the criminal liability of children is a difficult concept to
think about at the international level for two reasons. First,

Matthew Happold, “Child Soldiers, Victims or Perpetrators?” (2008) 29 U La Verne L
Rev 56 at 79 [Happold, “Child Soldiers”].
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psychological development varies from one child to another, which
leads to a difficulty in determining when the required element of
mens rea is acquired. Second, no minimum age for criminal liability
exists under international law because countries conflict on what this
age should be.
A. PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHILD AND CONSEQUENCES
OF THE REQUIRED MENS REA ELEMENT
An accused can be found liable under international criminal
law only when the actus reus is committed with intent.3 This is
referred to as mens rea. A crucial aspect to take into consideration in
any discussion on the criminal liability of children is the ability for
one child to act with this required intent. Many authors have written
on the psychological development of the child and the subsequent
ability to intend to commit a criminal act.4 Their studies demonstrate
that, up to a certain age, a child is not fully able to understand his or
her acts, nor the consequences attached to it; however, the exact age
at which an individual can commit a criminal act with the required
mens rea element is not clearly determined. This is a problem, in the
sense that, from a psychological point of view, some children should
be able to be found liable under international criminal law while
others should not.
This conclusion is supported by neuroscientific research.
Professor Naomi Cahn suggests that even though “the law has not
historically depended on brain science, (...) the modern study of
neuroscience offers the prospect of identifying more specific causes
[related to adolescents’ criminal behaviours].”5 In her paper dealing
with the impact of neuroscience on understanding child soldiers’
actions, she mentions that early abuse and neglect can change the
structure of children’s brains: “when children are abused or neglected,
their brains may develop so that they overact to situations that are
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art 30.
Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgement of the Child (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1932) [Piaget]; L Kohlberg, Child Psychology and Childhood Education - A Cognitive
Developmental View (New York: Longman, 1987).
5 Naomi Cahn, “Poor Children: Child “Witches” and Child Soldiers in Sub-Saharan
Africa” (2006) 3 Ohio St J Crim L 413 at 429.
3
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threatening so that delinquent behavior results from the brain using
these early lessons of fear to defend itself.”6 These elements show that
child soldiers are different from adults because their psychological and
biological development is different. These observations must be taken
into account when examining their criminal liability. Another huge
difficulty in determining whether child soldiers could be held liable
under international criminal law is the fact that international law
does not provide for a minimum age of criminal liability.
B. ABSENCE OF MINIMUM AGE FOR CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The minimum age for criminal liability represents the age at
which an individual can be legally prosecuted for crimes. Under
international law, an adult is understood to be an individual who has
attained the age of eighteen years.7 It follows from this that if a child’s
criminal liability does not exist, only adults can be prosecuted for
international crimes. On the other hand, if liability does exist, the
minimum age for criminal liability does not correspond with the age
at which majority is attained. How is the age of criminal liability to be
determined? This central question has unfortunately stayed
unanswered under international law for decades. There is no
overarching agreement among nations; the minimum age for criminal
liability differs widely from one country to another, with one of the
youngest ages fixed at six in some Mexican states for non-federal
crimes, while the oldest age fixed at sixteen years in Argentina.8
International law does, however, provide minimal guidance
on how to determine what the minimum age should be. The United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice (or “Beijing rules”) provide that:
Ibid at 426.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3, Can TS
1992 No 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990) [CRC]. This treaty is one of the most
6
7

widely ratified international instruments. In article 1, it states that “For the purposes
of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of
eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained
earlier.” This may be understood as an international consensus.
8 UNICEF, “Special Protections: Progress & Disparity” in The Progress of Nations
1997, online: UNICEF <http://www.unicef.org/pon97/p56a.htm>.
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[i]n those legal systems recognising the concept of the age of
criminal responsibility for juveniles, the beginning of that
age shall not be fixed at too low an age limit, bearing in
mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual
maturity.9

This non-binding notion was since codified and expanded in the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) in its article 40(3):
State parties shall seek to promote the establishment of laws,
procedures, authorities and institutions specifically
applicable to children alleged as, accused of, or recognized as
having infringed the penal law, and, in particular: (a) The
establishment of a minimum age below which children shall
be presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal
law.10

The Committee on the Rights of the Child (the “Committee”), which
is tasked with interpreting the CRC, recommends that this minimum
age not be too low; indeed, it has asked some countries to raise the
minimum age provided in their domestic legislation.11 However, the
practice of the Committee is of little help in determining a standard
minimum age for criminal liability under international law. As noted
by some:
it is not helpful in seeking to move towards consistency
when it [the Committee] criticizes the minimum age of 10 in
England as being unlawful, while only recommending that
Ireland, which had just raised the minimum age from 7 to
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice,
GA Res 40/33, UNGAOR, 40th Sess, UN Doc A/Res/40/33, (1985) 206 [Beijing Rules],
r 4.
10 CRC, supra note 7, art 40(3).
11 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee
on the Rights of the Child: Australia, 16th Sess, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.79, (1997);
Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on
the Rights of the Child: India, 23d Sess, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.115 (2000);
Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on
the Rights of the Child: Fiji, 18th Sess, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.89 (1998); Committee
on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights
of the Child: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 8th Sess, UN
Doc CRC/C/15/Add.34 (1995); Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding
Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Barbados, 21st Sess, UN
Doc CRC/C/15/add.103 (1999).
9
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10, only consider reviewing the age with a view to
increasing it.12

Comments from the Committee are, however, helpful to the extent
that they provide guidance as to how criminal liability shall be
determined. For instance, the Committee believes that criminal
responsibility should be based on objective factors such as age instead
of subjective factors such as “the attainment of puberty, the age of
discernment or the personality of the child.”13
Similarly, international criminal law does not provide clarity
in determining the minimum age of criminal liability. The statutes of
various international criminal tribunals are conflicting on this point.
While the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(“ICTR”) statutes are silent on the issue, the Serious Crimes Panels in
East Timor have jurisdiction over minors over twelve years of age14
and the Special Court of Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) has jurisdiction to
prosecute children over fifteen years of age.15 However, the statute of
the SCSL strictly regulates prosecution of children under eighteen
years of age and privileges rehabilitation as opposed to other
traditional aims of punishment.16 The SCSL has never prosecuted a
person younger than eighteen, and the Chief Prosecutor, David Crane,
had made it very clear that he would not prosecute children.17 The
Rome Statute gives jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court
(“ICC”) to prosecute individuals over eighteen years of age.18 While
some may interpret the Rome Statute’s provision as establishing a rule
under international criminal law because of the permanency of the
ICC and its potential universal jurisdiction, this argument neglects

Geraldine Van Bueren, Art 40: Child Criminal Justice (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2006) at 27.
13 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Report on the 10th Session, 10th Sess, UN
Doc CRC/C/46 (1995).
14 United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, Regulation 2000/30
Section 45 On Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedures, online: East Timor Law
Journal <http://www.eastimorlawjournal.org/UNTAETLaw/Regulations/>
15 Statute of the SCSL, supra note 1.
16 Ibid.
17 See IRIN, “SIERRA LEONE: Special Court will not indict Children” online: IRIN
<http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=35524>.
18 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art 26.
12
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two things. First, the provision is more procedural than substantive.19
Exclusion from the jurisdiction of the ICC simply leaves the task of
prosecuting child soldiers to domestic jurisdictions.20 Second, it
appears that the exclusion was to avoid arguments before the ICC as
to what the minimum age for criminal liability should be under
international law.21
In light of the above-mentioned considerations, one can say
that a reasonable age to fix criminal liability should be somewhere in
the mid-teens (thirteen, fourteen, fifteen).22 Most domestic systems
recognize criminal liability around that age; therefore, this option
would follow current state practice. It would also comply with the
international guidance given on the issue. As well, it would be
supported by psychological analyses that tend to demonstrate that
from the age of fifteen years, children may be capable of moral
responsibility. However, international criminal law must be precise
and cannot vaguely prescribe that children in their mid-teens should
be able to face international jurisdiction. Instead, a clear and precise
age should be given. It would then be up to the court to determine
whether it will prosecute children under eighteen. As was the case in
Sierra Leone, a court might decide not to use its prerogative. The SCSL
has the jurisdiction to prosecute children of fifteen years and older,
and this would be a starting point in trying to determine what the age
for criminal liability should be under international criminal law. This
choice is reinforced by other provisions of international criminal law
that have established fifteen as the minimum age to legally recruit and
use children in armed forces.23 This suggests that from that age,
children are capable of making independent choices. Under the age of
fifteen, children cannot legally join armed forces and therefore, they
should not be held liable for their crimes under that age. This is not to
suggest that children under fifteen cannot be perpetrators of
international crimes. Some may have committed crimes with full
Happold, “Child Soldiers”, supra note 2 at 79.
Otto Triffterer, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (Munchen, Germany: CH Beck, 2008) at 777.
21 Ibid at 775.
22 Matthew Happold, The Age of Criminal Responsibility in International Criminal
Law (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2006) [Happold, “Age of Criminal
Responsibility”].
23 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art 8(2)(b)(xxvi); Statute of the SCSL, supra note 1, art
4(c).
19
20
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conscience, but most of them might be too young to fully understand
their acts. Similarly, children over fifteen may have committed crimes
without fully understanding their acts. There is also some overlap,
where children who were recruited before they were fifteen may
have remained soldiers after, and subsequently committed crimes over
the age of fifteen. A line must be drawn somewhere and the law must
be clear. In most cases, children above fifteen do understand their acts
and are capable of making independent choices such as joining an
armed group. International criminal law has already recognized this
and similarly, it should recognize fifteen as a compelling age for
criminal liability.
This section has demonstrated that prosecuting children at the
international level would certainly not be without difficulties. The
main issue would relate to determining who is a child; examining on a
case-by-case basis whether a specific child’s psychological
development allowed for an understanding of his or her criminal acts,
and reaching a consensus on what the minimum age for criminal
liability is. Thinking about whether child soldiers should be
prosecuted by international criminal tribunals requires us to
overcome these difficulties. It also requires justifications. In other
words, if current practice of international criminal tribunals is to
refuse to prosecute child soldiers, what would be the grounds under
which one would say that, theoretically, they could be prosecuted?
II
RATIONALE FOR PROSECUTING CHILD SOLDIERS
As mentioned in the previous section, international criminal
law is not clear on the issue of the minimum age for criminal liability.
While the ICC does not have jurisdiction to prosecute children under
eighteen, the SCSL has jurisdiction for those of fifteen years and over.
This indeterminacy indicates that there is no categorical objection to
the prosecution of children. Therefore, it is important to examine the
rationales upon which international criminal law could rely, if it was
decided that child soldiers could be prosecuted. Several arguments can
be developed. First, such prosecutions are in accordance with the aim
of international criminal justice. Second, they seem to be authorized
by international human rights law. Third, most domestic systems
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allow prosecutions of child soldiers and, in fact, some have done so.
Finally, we are currently witnessing a case within international
criminal law, that of Dominic Ongwen, indicating that the
prosecution of individuals for crimes committed as children may be
possible.
A. AIM OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THEORIES OF
PUNISHMENT
International criminal law pursues several goals which are
quite similar to the ones found under domestic law. These include
retribution and deterrence, but also other goals such as bringing
justice to the victims. Emphasis of these goals is important since they
may give substantial grounds to the argument that child soldiers
should be prosecuted.

(i) Domestic Law vs. International Law
International criminal law deals with the most serious crimes
of international concern.24 International criminal tribunals have been
established in order to make sure that those who violate these norms
will respond to their acts. The idea is that some crimes are so horrific
that the international community must ensure that perpetrators will
not go unpunished. However, punishment may serve several goals and
it is important to analyze whether theories of punishment found
under international criminal law are the same as the ones found under
domestic laws. One may think that the gravity of these international
crimes, characterized by mass atrocity, would justify a different basis
for punishment than domestic crimes. Moreover, the specificity of
international criminality may justify additional aims for punishment,
such as telling the history of a conflict or achieving reconciliation
between societies.25 However, it seems that theories of punishment
find the same grounds in international criminal law as in domestic
criminal law. Drumbl expresses this view when talking about
international criminal law that “despite the extraordinary nature of
Rome Statute, supra note 1.
Robert Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 31, 33.
24
25
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this criminality, its modality of punishment, theory of sentencing, and
process of determining guilt or innocence each remains
disappointingly ordinary.”26

(ii) Retribution and Deterrence
Theories of punishment have been developed to understand
the rationale for prosecuting crimes that violate our most fundamental
norms. First, there is the justification of retribution. This theory is
often associated with Immanuel Kant,27 and it is based on the idea that
those who have violated social norms should be punished without
regard for the possible benefits (or drawbacks) of a prosecution.
Indeed, a wrongdoer should be punished only on the grounds that he
or she has committed a crime. Other justifications such as the wellbeing of the society are irrelevant because they equate to using a
human being as a tool to accomplish a specific goal.28 This theory is to
be distinguished from revenge. As explained by the ICTY:
“[retribution] is not to be understood as fulfilling a desire for revenge
but as duly expressing the outrage of the international community at
these crimes.”29 Looking at the jurisprudence of the international
criminal tribunals, retribution is, alongside deterrence, the most
prominent punishment rationale.30 Moreover, it seems that in
practice, international criminal law evidences a preference for
retributive motivations.31
Based on this retributive theory, child soldiers should be
prosecuted merely on the basis that they committed crimes. The
outcome here is seen as consequential; someone who does wrong must
be punished. However, there is an issue with this outcome because it
seems to neglect the mens rea element. If committing a criminal act is
sufficient to allow prosecution, it implies that only the actus reus is
Mark Drumbl, “Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of
Mass Atrocity” (2005) 99 NW U L Rev 539 at 541[Drumbl, “Collective Violence”].
27 Cryer, supra note 25 at 24.
28 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, translated by John Ladd
(London: The MacMillan Publishing Company, 1965) at 100.
29 Prosecutor v Zlatko Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1, Judgment (24 March 2000) at para 185
(International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber) online:
ICTY <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf>.
30 Drumbl, “Collective Violence”, supra note 26 at 559.
31 Ibid at 561.
26
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taken into account. Karl Marx wrote that G.W.F. Hegel’s theory on
punishment would be the only valid one because it is the only one
that “recognizes human dignity.”32 According to Hegel:
[p]unishment is the right of the criminal. It is an act of his
own will. The violation of right has been proclaimed by the
criminal as his own right. His crime is the negation of right.
Punishment is the negation of this negation, and
consequently an affirmation of right, solicited and forced
upon the criminal by himself.33

Nevertheless, Marx also points out that individuals are acting under
conditions of “capitalist unfreedom”34 and therefore cannot be held
responsible for their acts.35 According to him, a theory of punishment
is valid only where it elevates the criminal to “the position of a free
and self-determined being.”36 Without entering in an analysis of class,
Marx’s view on punishment could by extension be applied to child
soldiers in that it is based on the concept of freedom. Are child
soldiers really free when they commit a crime? Here is where the
mens rea element appears. Where someone is not free, how can he or
she commit an intentional act? The same logic could apply to adult
perpetrators. This negates the mens rea element, which is a
fundamental principal of criminal law.
As opposed to a Kantian view of punishment, some may argue
that the purpose of punishment is to serve society by promoting
deterrence. According to Jeremy Bentham, all actions must create the
greatest amount of happiness to the greatest amount of people.37 It
follows from this that a criminal should be punished proportionally to
the amount of harm which is caused by the offence and should be
sufficient to deter further offences.38 One may wonder whether
prosecuting child soldiers could be justified by deterrence because
child soldiers do not really have a choice as to the crimes they
Karl Marx, “Capital Punishment” New York Daily Tribune (18 February 1853).
Ibid.
34 J Angelo Corlett, Responsibility and Punishment, 3d ed (Dordrecht, Netherlands:
Springer, 2006).
35 Marx, supra note 32.
36 Ibid.
37 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
(Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1988) ch I at 3.
38 Ibid, ch XIV.
32
33
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commit. Therefore, it is doubtful that the deterrence argument would
be powerful in this case.
Most of the time, retribution and deterrence would not be
convincing justifications for the prosecution of child soldiers because
child soldiers do not act under free will. However, this global
reasoning is problematic because it neglects situations where child
soldiers actually make free choices. These choices start at the stage of
recruitment. It has been noted that “despite the ambiguity of
"voluntary" recruitment in contexts of severely constrained choices,
there is a complex rationale in a child’s decision to join whether for
ideological commitment, self-defense or economic survival.”39 Some
children may be more mature than others and some who join for
ideological commitment may strongly believe in their causes. While
some children do not freely and voluntarily join an armed group,
many others may do so. We must not automatically decide that
children do not have free will simply because they are children. It is
possible for a teenager around fifteen years to have a strong moral
understanding. Therefore, in these cases, it would be right to
prosecute children for the purposes of retribution and deterrence. It
has been argued that:
it is reasonable to ask whether absolving children of
responsibility for crimes they have committed is necessarily
in the best interests of the child. In at least some cases,
where the individual was clearly in control of their actions,
and not coerced, drugged, or forced into committing
atrocities, acknowledgement and atonement, including in
some instances prosecution, might be an important part of
personal recovery. It may also contribute to their acceptance
by families, communities and society at large.40

In the large majority of cases, retribution and deterrence could
not justify prosecution of child soldiers for their crimes because their
acts are not free. However, there may be some cases in which free will

Dana Landau, “Child Soldiers - The Use of Child Soldiers”, online: International
Relations and Security Network

39

<www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/content/.../01%20Use%20of%20Children.pdf>.
40 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Global Report 2008 (London: Coalition
to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2008) at 36 online: Child Soldiers International
http://www.child-soldiers.org/global_report_reader.php?id=97.
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and intent to commit crimes could be demonstrated. In these cases,
prosecution could be justified under the grounds of retribution and
deterrence. Prosecution of child soldiers could also be justified by the
other goals international criminal law intends to achieve.

(iii) Other Goals
Apart from retribution and deterrence, international criminal
justice has other goals which may be stronger grounds upon which to
justify the prosecution of child soldiers. First, international criminal
prosecutions may be pursued for the purpose of rehabilitation.
According to this theory, the point of criminal sanction is the
reformation of the wrongdoer.41 International criminal law applied
this theory in the ICTY’s Erdomević case by condemning the accused
to only five years of imprisonment, despite his conviction for taking
part in an execution squad which murdered hundreds of Bosnian
Muslim civilian men between the ages of seventeen and sixty. This
was classified as a crime against humanity. He killed approximately
one-hundred persons. The tribunal stated that he “should be given a
second chance to start his life afresh upon release, whilst still young
enough to do so.”42 Therefore, condemning child soldiers to low
sentences may help them to reintegrate within the society while they
are still young, and society would feel that the wrongs committed by
child soldiers have been dealt with. It may also be more inclined to
reaccept them and move forward.
The aim of rehabilitation goes hand in hand with another
one-that of bringing justice to the victims. Traditionally, international
criminal law focused on the accused in the sense that it is necessary
for the accused to benefit from a fair trial.43 However, international
criminal law has been influenced by civil law systems such as France
in which victims play a large part in the proceedings.44 The ICC has
developed an original way of dealing with victims by allowing them
to participate in the proceedings when their interests are affected.45

Cryer, supra note 25 at 28.
Prosecutor v Erdemović, IT-96-22-Tbis, Judgement (5 March 1998) at para 16
(International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Trials Chamber).
43 Cryer, supra note 25 at 478.
44 Ibid.
45 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art 68.
41
42
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This is because it was recognized that one of the aims of international
criminal law is to bring justice to the victims. As a result, “it would be
paradoxical to keep saying victims should only have an auxiliary role
when one of the reasons why proceedings take place is the victim
itself.”46 Justice for the victims may be the most relevant justification
when dealing with prosecution of child soldiers. One can hardly
imagine how victims of child soldiers would reaccept these children as
part of their community without feeling that justice had been done.
Therefore, this idea of bringing justice to the victims is crucial. Recent
history demonstrates that international law recognizes that victims
should be heard. Following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, calls from
victims of genocide to see the children who participated in it being
prosecuted led to the arrest and detention of many children within
Rwanda.47 This situation represented the first time in history where
children accused of committing genocide were imprisoned and tried.48
Another example relates to Sierra Leone. At the time of discussions in
2000-2001 surrounding the creation of the SCSL to address crimes
against humanity and war crimes committed after November 30,
1996, it was said that “the people of Sierra Leone would not look
kindly upon a court which failed to bring to justice children who
committed crimes of that nature and spared them the judicial process
of accountability.”49 Many children’s rights advocates argued that
child soldiers should not be prosecuted within the SCSL;50
nevertheless, the UN Secretary-General stated that:
Within the meaning attributed to it in the present Statute,
the term “most responsible” would not necessarily exclude
children between 15 and 18 years of age. [...] the gravity and
seriousness of the crimes they have allegedly committed
would allow for their inclusion within the jurisdiction of the

Cryer, supra note 25 at 479.
Chen Reis, “Trying the Future, Avenging the Past: The Implications of Prosecuting
Children for Participation in Internal Armed Conflict” (1997) 28 Colum HRL Rev 629
at 629.
48 Ibid.
46
47

Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone, UNSCOR, 55th Sess, UN Doc S/2000/915 (2000), at para 35 [Report of the
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Secretary General].
50 Ibid.
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Court.51

Thus, the Statute for the SCSL permits the Prosecutor to prosecute
individuals who were aged between fifteen and eighteen years at the
time of their crime.52
Prosecuting child soldiers at the international level could be
supported in some cases by motives of deterrence and retribution.
However, the most convincing argument would be that such
prosecutions would form part of the process of bringing justice to the
victims. The idea that children could be prosecuted was supported by
some international organizations such as Amnesty International. It
stated, “[i]n some cases, child soldiers must be held accountable for
their actions, but any criminal action against them must respect
international fair trial standards.”53 Nevertheless, it is important to
acknowledge tensions between the various existing motives for
punishment. Retribution and deterrence being the primary goals of
international criminal justice, we cannot be sure whether prosecution
of child soldiers, when justified solely by the necessity to bring justice
to the victims, would be appropriate. Moreover, victims may not see
criminal prosecutions as the best way to obtain justice, for instance in
societies where the focus is on reconciliation and forgiveness.
However, prosecution of child soldiers can be justified on another
ground; that being that such prosecutions are allowed by international
human rights law.
B. ALLOWED BY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Because of the newness of international criminal law, many
unresolved issues, such as the question of whether or not child
soldiers can be prosecuted, may find some guiding answers in the
more established but related field of international human rights law.
Therefore, it is important to see what that area of the law
recommends. Interestingly, international human rights law does not

51
52

Ibid at para 30.
Statute of the SCSL, supra note 1.

Amnesty International, “Child Soldiers: Criminals or Victims?” (22 December 2000)
part 2, online: Amnesty International <http://
www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR50/002/2000/en/dom-IOR500022000en.html>.

53
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argue against child prosecution. Analysis of the CRC is a very strong
indicator of the views of the international community on issues
related to children’s rights due to the fact that it is the most widely
ratified international human rights instrument.54 The CRC does not
explicitly say that prosecution of children is authorized. Instead, it
contains provisions on the criminal liability of children, stating that if
a child is to be prosecuted, certain conditions must be respected. This
is a strong indicator that the international community, through states’
ratifications of the CRC, agrees that child prosecution could occur and
a fortiori is authorized. Indirectly, it also means that the international
community thinks that children can have the necessary mens rea
when committing a crime. This conclusion conforms to the laws
applicable domestically. Indeed, “under many national legal systems
children as young as ten years (or even less in some jurisdictions) are
deemed capable of forming the requisite intent to commit a crime.”55
The fact that an international treaty as widely ratified as the
CRC recognizes that prosecution of children can occur at a domestic
level impacts our understanding of international law. Indeed,
provisions of the CRC have crystallized under customary international
law.56 Indirectly, this indicates that the international community is
not substantially opposed to the prosecution of children at the
international level. However, should children be prosecuted by
international criminal tribunals such as the SCSL, these tribunals
would have to respect standards provided by the CRC. Nevertheless,
“By July 1, 1997, virtually every nation had ratified or acceded to the CRC, with the
exception of the United States and Somalia”: Jonathan Todres, Mark E Wojcik & Cris
R Revas, eds, The Convention on the Rights of the Child - An Analysis of Treaty
Provisions and Implications of US Ratification (New York: Transnational Publishers,
2006) at 14.
55 Steven Freeland, "Mere Children or Weapons of War- Child Soldiers and
International Law" (2008) 29 U La Verne L Rev 19 at 49.
56 Customary international law reflects a general practice perceived as having the
force of law. Because the CRC has been ratified by almost every nation, it is clear that
it is perceived by states as having the force of law. Moreover, domestic and
international tribunals have looked at the CRC for guidance and to support their
decisions, thereby reflecting general practice. See Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 US
551; also see Sahin v Germany (2003) ECHR, 30943/96, 36 EHRR 43; Sommerfeld v
Germany (2003) ECHR, 31871/96; Reports of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (Art 64(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights) (2002), Advisory
Opinion OC-17/02, Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser A) No 17 online:
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/series_A_OC-17.html>.
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one can argue that international crimes are different from domestic
crimes. Therefore, the analysis at the international level should be
different from the one that occurs at the domestic level. The main
issue here occurs in terms of mens rea. As noted above, for many
countries, children are capable of having the intent to commit a
crime. However, Happold notes that others have argued that
international crimes cannot be intentionally committed by children
because they require such onerous mens rea requirements that
children will always lack capacity to commit them.57 Happold
disagrees with this, and argues that while genocide requires specific
intent, other international crimes do not require such a high burden
of proof and therefore this argument cannot be used to distinguish
between crimes committed under domestic laws from crimes
committed under international law.58 This argument is powerful and
emphasises the idea that the intentional element is the same for
international crimes as for domestic crimes only when dealing with
war crimes. This means that the CRC is to be understood as applying
in the same way to domestic crimes and war crimes. It could apply
differently to genocide.
The idea that children can be prosecuted when they commit
crimes is supported by the international community through wide
ratification of the CRC, but also through ratification of regional
treaties. For instance, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare
of the Child (“African Charter”) contains a provision on the
administration of juvenile justice.59 This instrument has been ratified
by thirty-seven African states out of fifty-three.60 This means that, in
addition to agreeing through ratification of the CRC children can be
prosecuted, a large majority of African states reiterated their
commitment to this idea. In addition, the European Court of Human
Rights (“ECHR”), which is also governed by a regional treaty, ruled in
the same way. In the case of two ten year-old boys who abducted and
killed a two year-old and were convicted,61 the ECHR ruled that:

Happold, “Child Soldiers” supra note 2 at 72.
Ibid.
59 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 11 July 1990, OAU Doc
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (entered into force 29 November 1999), arts 17 and 30.
60 Africa Union “Status of Ratification of the Charter as at February 2004”, online:
<http://www.africa-union.org/child/home.htm>.
61 T v United Kingdom and V v United Kingdom, [2000] 30 EHRR 121.
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even if England and Wales is among the few European
jurisdictions to retain a low age of criminal responsibility,
the age of ten cannot be said to be so young as to differ
disproportionately from the age limit followed by other
European States. The Court concludes that the attribution of
criminal responsibility does not in itself give rise to a breach
of Article 3 of the Convention.62

However, the conclusion drawn from this decision can be contested in
the sense that the two boys were tried in an adult court, before a
judge and a jury and during public hearings.63 Therefore, no specific
procedure as guaranteed by the CRC was used.64
As illustrated above, international human rights law contains
provisions on child criminal liability. Many domestic jurisdictions
allow the prosecution of children who commit crimes and
international human rights law acknowledges this fact. But in doing
so, it also gives conditions under which such prosecutions can occur.
For instance, it limits the range of sanctions by formally prohibiting
the death penalty. Because international human rights law does not
prevent national jurisdictions from prosecuting child soldiers, its
corollary is that international human rights law does not go against
prosecution of child soldiers at the international level as long as
special standards are respected.
C. DOMESTIC PROSECUTIONS OF CHILD SOLDIERS
The Rome Statute of the ICC is being implemented at the
domestic level by its States Parties. Most of these domestic
jurisdictions have a juvenile justice system in place, thereby allowing
prosecution of children. This indicates that, child soldiers could be
prosecuted by many domestic systems, and this has, in fact, already
occurred in several instances.
Ibid at 176.
Matthew Happold, “The Age of Criminal Responsibility in International Criminal
Law” in Karin Arts & Vesselin Popovski, eds, International Criminal Accountability
and the Rights of Children (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006), online:
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=934567> at 5 [Happold, “Age of
Criminal Responsibility in ICL”].
64 Ibid.
62
63
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(i) Implementation of the Rome Statute by Domestic Systems
States party to the Rome Statute have a legal obligation to
include the international crimes contained in the Rome Statute within
their own domestic systems.65 For instance, in Canada, the Crimes
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act was introduced in order to
“implement the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.”66
Since the minimum age for criminal liability in Canada is twelve
years, it means that, in theory, a child could be prosecuted in Canada
for international crimes. Another example is the case of France, which
is a monist system, meaning that the Rome Statute has a direct effect
on domestic law.67 However, in order to be able to implement its
obligation of complementarity, the French domestic system had to
modify the criminal code.68 It was necessary to introduce the exact
same crimes as the ones provided in the Rome Statute. Under French
law, children are not criminally responsible unless they are capable of
understanding their acts.69 This means that a child could be
prosecuted under French law for international crimes. It is important
to mention that 114 countries have ratified the Rome Statute and
sixty-five of them have already implemented it within domestic law.70
Thirty-five countries also have some form of advanced draft
implementing legislation.71 This data suggests that, in sixty-five
countries, individuals can be prosecuted for international crimes
within the jurisdiction of the ICC and another thirty-five countries
Art 1 of the Rome Statute provides that the ICC is complementary to national
criminal jurisdiction. In his inaugural speech, the ICC prosecutor introduced the idea
of positive complementarity. Under this principle, the ICC shall encourage national
systems to prosecute crimes that fall under the ICC jurisdiction. It is to be contrasted
with negative complementarity under which the ICC prosecute crimes within its
jurisdiction when states are unwilling or unable to do so: Benjamin N Schiff, Building
the International Criminal Court (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at
117.
66 Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act, SC 2000, c 24.
67 Constitution de la République Française, JO, 4 October 1958, art 55.
68 Art 212-2 of the Criminal Code was modified by law 2010-930 du 9 août 2010
portant adaptation du droit pénal à l'institution de la Cour Pénale Internationale.
69 art 122-8 C pén.
70 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, “Ratification and Implementation”,
online: Coalition for the International Criminal Court
<http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=ratimp>.
71 Ibid.
65
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will soon be able to do so. As mentioned earlier in this article, most
countries allow for the prosecution of children in their domestic
system. This leads to the conclusion that, potentially, a majority of the
countries in the world could prosecute children for international
crimes within their domestic system. If most of the domestic laws,
including those that have been imported from the international level,
allow for the prosecution of children, then why should international
criminal law rule in a different way?

(ii) Domestic Prosecutions of Child Soldiers
Theoretical considerations which state that child soldiers
could be prosecuted by most domestic systems are supported to some
extent by states’ practices. Child soldiers have been prosecuted in
Africa and more recently by the United States.

(a) In Africa
In Africa, child soldiers have been charged under domestic
laws for international crimes including war crimes. For instance, in
2000, the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) executed a fourteen
year-old child soldier and, in 2001, another four aged between
fourteen and sixteen were condemned to death.72 In the end, these
children were not executed due to pressures from non-governmental
organizations (“NGOs”).73 In Uganda, two former child soldiers were
accused of treason.74 However, these charges were later withdrawn,
following lobbying by Human Rights Watch, on the basis that Uganda
was under the international obligation to rehabilitate child soldiers.
Human Rights Watch, “Letter to Foreign Minister of Democratic Republic of
Congo” (2 May 2001), online: Human Rights Watch
<http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/index.html>; Human Rights Watch, Press Release
“Congo: Don't Execute Child Soldiers: Four Children to be Put to Death” (2 May
2001), online: Human Rights Watch <http://
www.hrw.org/press/2001/05/congo0502.html>; Human Rights Watch, “Congo Spares
Child Soldiers” (June 2001), online: HRW <http://hrw.org/updatew/2001/06.html>.
73 Ibid.
74 Human Rights Watch, “Uganda: Letter to Minister of Justice” (19 February 2003),
online: HRW <http://hrw.org/pres/2003/02/uganda021903-ltr.html>; Human Rights
Watch, Press Release “Uganda: Drop Treason Charges against Child Abductees”
(March 4, 2003), online: HRW
<http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/03/uganda030403.html>.
72
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Another interesting case is the situation in Rwanda mentioned earlier,
under which children were charged at the domestic level with
committing genocide, an international crime implemented
domestically. It was reported that almost 4000 children were detained
in Rwanda following the genocide, only 1500 of whom had been
released from detention by 2001.75 Two institutions allowed
prosecution of child soldiers: the domestic courts and gacaca
proceedings. Gacaca proceedings are a traditional method of dispute
resolution adapted to promote accountability for offenses related to
genocide.76 Gacaca proceedings are different from the Rwandan
conventional courts because their focus is on both retribution and
reconciliation.77 Because of this, gacaca proceedings offer a more
diversified array of punishment ranging from imprisonment to
community service.78 Gacaca proceedings also recognize that minors
should be treated differently from adults. Minors under fourteen years
cannot face prosecution but can be placed in special solidarity camps,
whereas minors between fourteen and eighteen must benefit from
reduced punishment.79 Rwandan legislation provides that offenders
under the age of fourteen cannot incur penal responsibility.80
Offenders between the age of fourteen and eighteen are entitled to
raise their status as minors as a mitigating factor in sentencing.81 In
prosecuting those responsible for genocide, the Rwandan courts
applied these mitigating factors. For instance, a minor under eighteen
found guilty before domestic courts of killing five Tutsi children was
sentenced to only five years’ imprisonment.82 A last example is the
one of DRC where, very recently, a fifteen year-old accused of rape
was found to be outside the jurisdiction of a military court which tried
individuals for crimes against humanity and was sent to be tried in a

Nienke Grossman, “Rehabilitation or Revenge: Prosecuting Child Soldiers for
Human Rights Violations” (2007) 38 Geo J Int'l L 323 at 351.
76 Mark Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 85 [Drumbl, “Atrocity, Punishment”].
77 Ibid at 86.
78 Ibid at 88.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid at 79.
81 Ibid.
82 Ministère Public v. Nzabonimpa, RMP 69.430/S4/KD, RP/R1/98 (28 December
1998) (Gisenyi 1ère Instance).
75
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domestic juvenile court.83 Read together, these elements may be
interpreted as indicating that child soldiers may be prosecuted under
domestic jurisdictions, under the condition that their status as
juveniles is respected. Therefore, if they are to be prosecuted, juvenile
justice systems should be used.

(b) The Case of Omar Khadr
Omar Khadr is a Canadian citizen who was born in 1986. It is
alleged that his father “was a high-ranking member of Egyptian
Islamic Jihad, a senior Al-Qaeda operative and a close associate of
Osama bin Laden.”84 It is also alleged that from 1996 until 2001,
Khadr:
travelled throughout Afghanistan with his father meeting
senior Al-Qaeda members and visiting Al-Qaeda training
camps and guest houses. In the summer of 2002, he received
personal training in the use of arms and explosives and, on
completion of his training, joined a team of Al-Qaeda
operatives constructing and planting landmines targeted
against U.S. and coalition forces.85

Khadr is accused by U.S. officials to have murdered the U.S. sergeant
Christopher Speer by throwing a grenade at him during a firefight
between U.S. Special Forces and a group of Al-Qaeda operatives.86
Following his arrest and transfer to Guantanamo Bay, Khadr was
charged under the newly created system of Guantanamo Military
Commissions with “conspiracy, murder by an unprivileged
belligerent, [and] attempted murder by an unprivileged belligerent.”87
However, these commissions were later struck down as being
unconstitutional.88 Instead, new charges were brought against Khadr

Kelly Askin, “Guilty”, online: Blog Open Society <
http://blog.soros.org/2011/02/fizi-diary-guilty/>.
84 Happold, “Child Soldiers”, supra note 3 at 59.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid at 57.
87 US v Omar Khadr, Case No 05-0008, United States Military Commission, online:
<http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/20120820T102927Khadr_Omar_Charges_Nov_2005.pdf>.
88 Hamdam v Rumsfeld, [2006] 548 US 557. It was held in this case that the military
commissions lack “the power to proceed because its structures and procedures violate
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after the Military Commission Act was signed.89 These include
“Murder in Violation of the Law of War, Attempted Murder in
Violation of the Law of War, Conspiracy, [and] Providing Material
Support for Terrorism and Spying.”90 In October 2011, he entered a
guilty plea.91 According to the plea agreement, Khadr pled guilty “in
exchange for an eight-year sentence, with a likely transfer to a
Canadian prison after one year.”92
Khadr’s case is controversial in many aspects and his
prosecution has been widely criticized. Commentators such as David
Crane, the first Prosecutor at the SCSL, have argued that child
soldiers, including Omar Khadr, should not be prosecuted. They are
primarily seen as victims who do not have the choice but to kill and
therefore lack the mens rea to commit war crimes.93 Other
commentators such as Matthew Happold do not exclude the idea that
child soldiers could be prosecuted under certain circumstances;
however, they have criticized the process under which Omar Khadr
was prosecuted.94 In prosecuting Omar Khadr, the United States did
not respect its international obligations in terms of respecting juvenile
justice standards.95
Countries that have ratified the Rome Statute are under the
obligation to prosecute individuals accused of international crimes.
This obligation implies that when these countries have a functioning
juvenile justice system, they are under the obligation to prosecute
child soldiers when appropriate. However, due to states’ overlapping
both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the four Geneva Conventions signed in
1949.”
89 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub L No 109-366, 120 Stat 2600.
90 See the indictment in the case of United States v Omar Khadr, online:
<http://www.defense.gov/news/Apr2007/Khadrreferral.pdf>.
91 Jeanne Meserve, "Youngest Guantanamo detainee pleads guilty" CNN (25 October
2010), online: CNN <http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/10/25/khadr.plea/>.
92Andrea Prasow, “Khadr’s Plea Agreement and Sentencing: Questions Never to be
Answered” (5 November 2010), online: Amnesty International
<http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/11/05/khadrs-plea-agreement-and-sentencing>.
93 David Crane, “Children as Terrorists, Wrong to Train, Wrong to Charge” (2008),
online: Jurist Forum <http://jurist.org/forum/2008/02/children-as-terrorists-wrong-totrain.php>.
94 Happold, “Child Soldiers” supra note 2 at 72.
95 Human Rights Watch, “The Omar Khadr Case: A Teenager Imprisoned at
Guantanamo” (June 2007), online: Human Rights Watch
<http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/06/01/omar-khadr-case>.
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obligations between the Rome Statute and other international treaties,
states are also under the legal obligation to respect standards imposed
by other international instruments. If domestic systems must
prosecute child soldiers, respecting international standards, why
would international criminal justice be different?
D. OPENINGS UNDER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROSECUTION OF
CHILDREN FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
The argument that children could be prosecuted by
international criminal tribunals is strengthened by the current legal
framework. Indeed, the ICC appears to be heading in the direction of
permitting the prosecution of child soldiers. The Lord’s Resistance
Army abducted Dominic Ongwen when he was ten and he has since
fought with that group.96 The ICC has issued an arrest warrant against
him for three counts of crimes against humanity and four counts of
war crimes.97 However, the question of whether he can be held liable
is controversial because he is a complex political victim.98 His early
victimization created the conditions under which he committed
serious crimes and also the conditions under which he became one of
the leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army. Dominic Ongwen has not
yet been arrested and the mandate of the ICC only allows the
prosecution of crimes that happened after 2002.99 At that time,
Dominic Ongwen was already an adult. Therefore, the case does not
directly illustrate a situation where an individual is being prosecuted
for crimes committed when he was a child. It does show a willingness
of the ICC to consider that victimization whilst a young child does not
necessarily imply lack of the mens rea requirement once you are an
adult.
Child soldiers are not merely innocent victims. They are also
perpetrators of international crimes. For this reason, arguments that
Justice and Reconciliation Project, “Complicating Victims and Perpetrators in
Uganda: On Dominic Ongwen” (July 2008), JRP Field Note 7, online:
<http://justiceandreconciliation.com/wpcontent/uploads/2008/07/JRP_FN7_Dominic-Ongwen.pdf> [“Ongwen Field Note”].
97 See International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber II Warrant of Arrest for
Dominic Ongwen, online: <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97201.pdf>.
98 “Ongwen Field Note”, supra note 96.
99 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art 11(1).
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they should be prosecuted can be made. However, prosecuting child
soldiers may not be in accordance with the mandate of international
criminal tribunals, which is to prosecute those who are the most
responsible.100 How can one seriously consider that a child who is a
victim of the crime of recruitment, and used to participate actively in
hostilities, would be the most responsible for the subsequent crimes
that occur? In addition to this, if international criminal tribunals were
to prosecute children, major difficulties would occur.
III
RATIONALE FOR EXCLUDING THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SOLDIERS
The previous section emphasized the arguments one can make
in favour of prosecuting child soldiers by international criminal
tribunals. However, there are also strong reasons to advocate in favour
of excluding such prosecutions. The prosecution of child soldiers
should not be allowed by international criminal law for three reasons.
First, even though the CRC contains provisions that can be
understood as favouring prosecution of child soldiers, it also contains
a provision on the best interests of the child. It is doubtful that
prosecuting child soldiers would be in their best interests. Second,
prosecuting child soldiers would raise serious practical issues.
International criminal tribunals, with the exception of the SCSL, do
not allow for such prosecutions. Though theoretically it would be
possible for some criminal tribunals to do so, one should consider the
difficulties that would arise. Third, in the event one argues that,
theoretically, child soldiers could be prosecuted by international
criminal tribunals and overcomes the challenges linked to such
prosecutions, it is unlikely that such prosecutions would be a success.
Indeed, child soldiers would be entitled to raise defences provided by
international criminal law and would rule out their liability.
A. SPECIAL GUARANTEES AND THE “BEST INTERESTS” OF THE CHILD
The CRC contains provisions on child criminal liability which
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allows one to think that the CRC supports prosecution of children.
However, these specific provisions have to be read in accordance with
article 3 of the CRC which refers to the “best interests” of the child as
a primary consideration.101 The Beijing rules also establish that the
aims of juvenile justice should include an emphasis on the “well-being
of the juvenile.”102 It is difficult to see how international prosecution
of children who are victims of those who recruit and use the soldiers
would serve the best interests of these children. Instead, the purpose
of juvenile justice is rehabilitation and, therefore, criminal
prosecutions should be a last resort.103 Moreover, in the context of the
debates on whether or not the SCSL should prosecute child soldiers,
some argued that the prosecution of child soldiers would not serve
their best interests and other solutions such as truth and
reconciliation commissions might be more appropriate.104 The Report
from the UN Secretary-General mentions that:
the
international
non-governmental
organizations
responsible for child-care and rehabilitation programmes,
together with some of their national counterparts, however,
were unanimous in their objections to any kind of judicial
accountability for children below 18 years of age for fear
that such a process would place at risk the entire
rehabilitation programme so painstakingly achieved.105
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The Office of the UN Special Representative for Children in Armed
Conflict argued that:
based on the current practice of ad hoc tribunals, the Special
Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court,
there is an emerging consensus that children below the age
of 18 should not be prosecuted for war crimes and crimes
against humanity by international courts.106

Moreover, some argue that children “have no place at a war crimes
tribunal, no matter how benevolent such a tribunal may be towards
them.”107
Prosecuting child soldiers may not be the best way to ensure
their reintegration and therefore, it may be against their best interests.
Even if prosecutions were not a barrier to their best interests, other
issues would have to be considered.
B. PRACTICAL ISSUES
Currently only the SCSL allows for prosecutions of child
soldiers, but it has never used its power to do so. This section aims at
giving an idea of practical concerns which international criminal
tribunals, including the ICC, would have to face if child soldiers were
prosecuted before them. International criminal tribunals simply do
not have the resources in place to ensure solid application of the rights
that should be guaranteed to juvenile offenders. In the CRC, children
are guaranteed procedural rights that are common to adults such as
the presumption of innocence but also specific rights such as the right
to privacy at all stages of the proceedings.108 International criminal
proceedings are structured around the principle of public hearings and
this principle is included in the statutes of international criminal

Human Rights Council, Annual Report of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General
for Children and Armed Conflict, UNHRCOR,12th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/12/49
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tribunals.109 Exceptions to the principle of public hearings are
provided by the Rome Statute in order, for instance, to protect
victims, witnesses or the accused.110 However, the Statute of the SCSL,
which allows for the prosecution of child soldiers, does not contain
any provision on the practical application of the right to privacy of
children. It only mentions that “the accused shall be entitled to a fair
and public hearing, subject to measures ordered by the Special Court
for the protection of victims and witnesses.”111 The issue here is to
determine what the “measures” are. One can imagine that protective
measures would be the same accorded to victims and witnesses of the
ICC such as protection of identity or distortion of voices and faces.112
However, there is currently one very controversial protective
measure, which is the use of anonymous witnesses.113 It has been
argued that it goes against the principle of transparency and fair trial
for the accused.114 Does the right to privacy include the right to be
prosecuted anonymously in the case of child soldiers?
Another practical problem with prosecuting child soldiers is
the double role they may play. In the ICC, victims’ participation is a
novelty and has appeared to be necessary.115 The Rome Statute
provides that:
where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the
Court shall permit their views and concerns to be presented
and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be
appropriate by the Court and in a manner which is not
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art 67(1); ICTY Statute, art 21(2); Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 8 November 1994, 33 ILM 1598, art
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prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused
and a fair and impartial trial.116

But what about case situations where victims are the same as the
perpetrators? Would it be fair to prosecute a child as a perpetrator
while knowing that he or she could also be considered a victim?
Wording of the Rome Statute indicates that as long as personal
interests of the victims are affected, these victims shall be able to
present their views and concerns at all stages of the proceedings.
Child soldiers cannot be prosecuted by the ICC. However, if this was
an option, it means that child soldiers accused of international crimes
and prosecuted by the ICC could legitimately request the status of
victim. This duality victim-perpetrator would pose a major challenge.
C. DEFENCES UNDER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
International criminal law is governed by general principles of
liability. In order to be found criminally liable, the elements of actus
reus (criminal act), mens rea (intent to commit a criminal act) and
grounds for excluding liability have to be examined. Concerning
crimes committed by child soldiers, the actus reus may be quite easy
to prove, assuming a prosecutor can locate witnesses or other
evidence. The next step is to examine whether the child had the
intention to commit such an act. As mentioned above, domestic
systems are entitled to determine a minimum age for criminal liability
under which an individual is deemed to be criminally irresponsible.
Such provisions are used to reflect the idea that, up to a certain age, an
individual does not have the capacity to fully understand his or her
acts and the consequences of these acts. Therefore, a lack of mens rea
is presumed. As noted earlier, international criminal law does not
determine a minimum age for criminal liability, so one cannot say
exactly where the line is to be drawn. However, one might suggest
that since the ICC does not have jurisdiction to prosecute minors,
minority status is a valid ground to go unpunished.117 Child soldiers
could also raise the defence of intoxication. Many studies have shown
that child soldiers are compelled to take alcohol or drugs in order to
116
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make them become fearless.118 Since the use of both impairs judgment,
international criminal law recognizes that involuntary intoxication is
an excuse.119 Last but not least is the defence of duress. Child soldiers
are subjected to brutal indoctrination methods used by the armed
groups to which they are part. It has been reported that children who
disobey their commanders are savagely killed in front of other
children in order to set an example.120 In these circumstances, child
soldiers are constantly under the threat of being tortured or killed.
Executing orders is the only way to survive for those children. The
Rome Statute clearly indicates that a person is not criminally
responsible when the crime was committed under duress.121 However,
in the Erdemović case, the ICTY said that duress was only a mitigating
factor.122 Since duress is approached differently by the various
international criminal tribunals, it is not clear whether child soldiers
could use this defence as an excuse that would rule out their liability.
What is clear is that they could at least invoke duress as a mitigating
factor.
IV
CONCLUSION
Child soldiers are complex political individuals who can be
considered both victims and perpetrators. If—contrary to calls from
most children’s rights organizations, child soldiers who committed
crimes are to be treated primarily as perpetrators—one should make
sure that a child is indeed legally capable of committing crimes. The
main issue when trying to answer the difficult question of child
criminal liability is the mens rea requirement. Can a child have the
intention to commit an international crime? No minimum age for
criminal liability is determined by international law for the reason
that no consensus can be reached. This age depends on the conception
UNICEF “Weah Speaks out About Child Soldiers”, online: UNICEF
<http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/liberia_19220.html>.
119 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art 31(1)(b).
120 See Ongwen Field Note, supra note 96.
121 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art 31(1)(d).
122 Prosecutor v Erdemović, IT-96-22-A, Judgment (7 October 1997) at para 19
(International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber),
online: ICTY <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-aj971007e.pdf>.
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each state has of childhood and therefore, it widely differs from one
country to another. Arguments in favour of the prosecution of child
soldiers find support in the theories of punishment, in international
human rights law and in domestic practices. Moreover, international
criminal law provides some openings towards this option. Arguments
given against the prosecution of child soldiers are grounded in the
idea that the best interests of the child should be respected. In
addition to this, in the event prosecutions occur, children would
benefit from defences provided by international criminal law.
Based on the above considerations, child soldiers should never
be prosecuted under the age of fifteen. However, prosecution of
children between fifteen and eighteen is not necessarily the best way
to implement the right to reintegration promoted by the CRC. This is
the reason why children between fifteen and eighteen could be held
accountable in ways other than criminal prosecutions, for instance by
using mechanisms of transitional justice other than criminal.123
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